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COMMENTS 
FEDERALISM AS A PREVENTIVE MEASURE: A VOIDING 
STATE ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL ANTI-GUN 
LEGISLATION IN 2013 
Brielle Hunt 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On December 14, 2012, the nation grappled with the inconceivable 
massacre of twenty-six residents of Newtown, Connecticut, twenty of them 
small children, in the second-deadliest school shooting in the history of the 
United States. 292 The number of casualties in the Newtown shooting is 
surpassed only by the 2007 massacre at Virginia Tech, during which a 
Virginia Tech student killed himself and thirty-two others.293 Last summer, 
an armed gunman entered a Colorado movie theatre and opened fire, killing 
twelve people and wounding fifty-eight more.294 This tragedy occurred only 
twenty miles from Littleton, Colorado, where twelve students and one 
teacher were murdered and twenty-four other students were wounded in the 
unforgettable Columbine High School shooting in 1999.295 Immediately 
following the most recent massacre in Newtown, many politicians surged 
forward with anti -gun legislation. The coverage of the shooting included 
interviews with children as young as five-years-old, triggering an emotional 
response from the American public and reigniting the gun control debate. 
As a result, on January 16, 2013, President Barack Obama issued twenty-
292 Susan Candiotti & Sarah Aarthun, Police: 20 Children among 26 victims of Connecticut school 
shooting, CNN (Dec. 15, 2012, 12:19AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/12/14/us/connecticut-school-
shooting. 
293 Christine Hauser & Anahad O'Connor, Virginia Tech Shooting Leaves 33 Dead, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 
16, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007 /04/l 6/us/l 6cnd-shooting.html ?pagewanted=all&_r=O#. 
294 Dan Frosch & Kirk Johnson, Gunman Kills 12 in Colorado, Reviving Gun Debate, N.Y. TIMES (July 
20, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/21/us/shooting-at-colorado-theater-showing-batman-
movie.html ?pagewanted=all. 
295 James Brooke, Terror in Littleton: The Overview; 2 Students in Colorado School Said to Gun Down 
as Many as 23 and Kill Themselves in Siege, N.Y. DMES (Apr. 21, 1999), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1999-/04/21/us/terror-littleton-overview-2-students-colorado-school-said-gun-
down-many-23-kill.html?page-wanted=all&src=pm. 
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three executive actions aimed at reducing gun violence m the United 
States.296 
There are many theories as to why controversial anti-gun legislation has 
been brought to the forefront of American politics. Since 1982, there have 
been at least sixty-two mass shootings across the country, covering at least 
thirty of the fifty states. 297 Twenty-five of those mass shootings have 
occurred since 2006. 298 The theory of "political salience" serves as one 
possible explanation for the push for gun control in 2013. "Salience" is the 
prominence of a political issue in the public mindset; it tends to manifest as 
a result of the interaction between voters and interest groups, media, 
political parties, and activists. 299 The most sensible time to propose 
controversial legislation, according to this theory, is immediately following 
an event that has struck a chord in the public's consciousness. 300 One such 
sensible time would be after twenty children are brutally shot to death in 
their classrooms because this would allow gun control supporters and left-
wing politicians to capitalize on the emotional reaction of the public. That 
is exactly what happened after Newtown with the President issuing an 
Executive memorandum301 and Congress introducing several pieces of gun-
control legislation. 302 
296 Now is the Time: Gun Violence Reduction Executive Actions, THE WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 16, 2013), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/wh_now _is_the_time_actions.pdf; See also 
Presidential Memorandum from the White House on Engaging in Public Health Research on the Causes 
and Prevention of Gun Violence to the Secretary of Health and Human Services, 78 Fed. Reg. 4295, 
(Jan. 16, 2013); Presidential Memorandum from the White House on Improving Availability of 
Relevant Executive Branch Records to the National Instant Criminal Background Check System to the 
Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 78 Fed. Reg. 4297, (Jan. 16, 2013); Presidential 
Memorandum from the White House on Tracing of Firearms in Connection with Criminal Investigations 
to the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 78 Fed. Reg. 4301, (Jan. 16, 2013). 
297 Mark Follman, Gavin Aronsen & Deanna Pan, A Guide to Mass Shootings in America, MOTHER 
JONES (Feb. 27, 2013, 7:45AM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/07/mass-shootings-map. 
298 Id. 
299 Ryan Card, Comment, Can States "Just Say No" to Federal Health Care Reform? The 
Constitutional and Political Implications of State Attempts to Nullify Federal Law, 2010 B.Y.U. L. REV. 
1795, 1819 (2010) ("When the political and economic stakes are high, interest groups and politicians 
seek to maintain an issue's salience long enough to capitalize from the political issue in the voting 
booth."). 
300 Id. 
301 See Now is the Time: Gun Violence Reduction Executive Actions, THE WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 16, 
2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/wh_now_is_the_time_actions.pdf. 
302 See, e.g., NICS Reporting Improvement Act of 2013, S. 480, !13th Cong. (2013); Fix Gun Checks 
Act of 2013, S. 374, I 13th Cong. (2013); Assault Weapons Ban of 2013, S. 150, I 13th Cong. (2013); 
Sandy Hook Elementary School Violence Reduction Act, S. 2, !13th Cong. (2013); Gun Trafficking 
Prevention Act of 2013, H.R. 452, I 13th Cong. (2013); Strengthening Background Checks Act of 2013, 
H.R. 329, I 13th Cong. (2013); Fire Sale Loophole Closing Act, H.R. 238, I 13th Cong. (2013); Support 
Assault Firearms Elimination and Reduction for our Streets Act, H.R. 226, I 13th Cong. (2013); 
Handgun Licensing and Regulation Act of 2013, H.R. 117, I 13th Cong. (2013); Blair Holt's Firearm 
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Conservatives across the nation fear that legislative response to the 
Newtown shooting will infringe on the individual's right to bear arms, 
established in the Second Amendment and affirmed in the landmark case of 
District of Columbia v. Heller.303 Republican members of the United State 
Congress have consequently responded with protective legislation.304 In the 
meantime, state legislatures have taken a different constitutional approach 
to preserve Second Amendment freedoms. While the Second Amendment 
remains at the heart of the debate, several states have attempted to pass state 
laws preventing state assistance to federal officials that infringe upon the 
Right to Bear Arms. 305 For example, in Virginia, Republican Delegate Bob 
Marshall introduced House Bill 2340, a bill that, if signed into law, would 
prevent state compliance with any federal anti-gun legislation. The 
summary of the text reads: 
A BILL to prevent any agency, political subdivision, or employee of Virginia 
from assisting the Federal Government of the United States in any 
investigation, prosecution, detention, arrest, search, or seizure under the 
authority of any federal statute enacted, or Executive Order or regulation 
issued, after December 31, 2012, infringing the individual Right to Keep and 
Bear Arms by imposing new restrictions on private ownership or private 
transfer of firearms, firearm magazines, ammunition, or components thereof. 
306 
On its face, this bill seems to violate the well-established Supremacy 
Clause.307 This comment will delve into this question, seeking to answer 
whether or not the Constitution allows states to refuse to comply with 
federal law. This analysis requires the application of a constitutional 
principle that reaches far beyond the scope of the Right to Bear Arms; it 
calls into play the vertical separation of powers and the rights belonging to 
state sovereigns described in the Tenth Amendment. The comment will 
proceed as follows. Part II will address the constitutionality of House Bill 
2340, compared against other kinds of legislation and in light of case law. It 
Licensing and Record of Sale Act of 2013, H.R. 34, 113th Cong. (2013). 
303 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). See generally U.S. CONST. amend. IL 
304 See e.g., Veterans Second Amendment Protection Act, H.R. 602, 113'h Cong. (2013); Respecting 
States' Rights and Concealed Carry Reciprocity Act of 2013, H.R. 578, 113'h Cong. (2013); Second 
Amendment Protection Act of 2013, H.R. 575, 113'h Cong. (2013); Restore the Constitution Act of 
2013, H.R. 410, 113'h Cong. (2013); Recreational Fishing and Hunting Heritage and Opportunities Act, 
S. 170, 113'h Cong. (2013); Separation of Powers Restoration and Second Amendment Protection Act of 
2013, S. 82, 113'h Cong. (2013). 
305 See e.g., H.B. 2340, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2013); S.B. 129, 2013 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 
2013); H.B. 120, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2013); H.B. 357, Gen. Assemb., 2013-2014 Reg. 
Sess. (Pa. 2013); H.B. 42, 108th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2013); H.B. 553, 83rd Reg. Sess. 
Fex. 2013); H.B. 0104, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Wyo. 2013). 
06 H.B. 2340, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2013). 
307 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be 
made in pursuance thereof. .. shall be the supreme law of the land."). 
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will be argued that the Federal Government cannot compel states to comply 
with certain types of federal law, and that states, as sovereigns, may pass 
state legislation to refuse such compliance. Part III will in turn explain the 
legal ramifications of state defiance, including Congress's constitutional 
power under the Spending Clause to grant or withhold federal funding 
where it sees fit, so long as the conditions are not deemed coercive. 
Consequently, Virginia and other states may have to forfeit federal funding 
should these bills pass, and will likely refer the bills to their respective 
appropriations committees to assess the economic forfeiture incurred by 
signing a non-compliance bill into law. 
II. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF HOUSE BILL 2340 
A. The 10th Amendment 
The Tenth Amendment of the United States Constitution explicitly limits 
the power of the Federal Government, and reserves those powers not 
enumerated by the Constitution to the States. 308 The Federal Government 
has been said to be a body of limited and enumerated powers, 309 and is only 
entitled to legislate in areas specifically delegated to it in the Constitution. 
Although interpretive tools have evolved over time, one way to determine 
what the Framers of the Constitution intended is to put the Framers' beliefs 
into context. In 1788, only three years before the Tenth Amendment was 
ratified, James Madison noted that the powers delegated by the proposed 
Constitution to the Federal Government are "few" and "defined" while 
those in the state governments are "numerous" and "indefinite."310 At the 
core of this division of power is the idea that without the States in the 
union, the United States would cease to exist as a political body. 311 The 
States existed before the Constitution, and the Constitution was created in 
an effort to "establish a more perfect union."312 The desire to preserve the 
States' independent authority and autonomy is evident through the early 
debates over the Virginia and New Jersey Plans. During these 
conversations, it was decided that Congress's legislative authority would be 
exercised directly over individuals rather than over the States. 313 
308 See U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
309 See Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 70 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
3lO THE FEDERALIST No. 45 (James Madison). 
311 Lane Cnty. v. Oregon, 74 U.S. 71, 76 (1868). 
312 U.S. CONST. pmbl.; see also id. 
313 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 164-65 (1992) (explaining the Virginia and New 
Jersey Plans). 
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Interestingly enough, one of the primary reasons the Virginia Plan was 
favored was to avoid the potential for coercion by the Federal Government 
upon the States.314 The Framers of the Constitution could not have been 
clearer in their intentions: the Federal Government was not to create laws 
that would coercively require States to comply with federal regulation. 
The Supreme Court has frequently recognized this reservation of state 
power.315 Justice Story referred to the Tenth Amendment as an essential tool 
of Constitutional interpretation.316 Because the Constitution is an instrument 
of limited and enumerated powers, he claimed, "it follows irresistibly, that 
what is not conferred, is withheld, and belongs to the states."317 As the 
nation has grown, the Tenth Amendment has served a broader purpose. The 
constitutional allocation of powers known as "federalism" has allowed the 
states to function as individual political sovereigns. In Gregory v. Ashcroft, 
the Supreme Court noted four specific ways in which the balance of powers 
is conducive to the state autonomy that the Framers sought to maintain: 
It assures a decentralized government that will be more sensitive to the diverse 
needs of a heterogenous society; it increases opportunity for citizen 
involvement in democratic processes; it allows for more innovation and 
experimentation in government; and it makes government more responsive by 
putting the States in competition for a mobile citizenry.318 
A system of federalism certainly has its advantages. The problem, 
however, is that, in spite of the clear intentions of the Framers and their 
obvious preservation of state power, the Federal Government still attempts 
to enact legislation that undermines the sovereign interests of states. Such 
interference with state sovereignty is not included in the limited powers 
enumerated to the Federal Government in the Constitution. 319 Critics of the 
American system of federalism have analogized this abuse of federal power 
with a superior-subordinate relationship, rather than the dual-sovereignty 
system that was intended. 320 Although the vertical separation of power 
314 Edmund Randolph, The Virginia Plan, OUR DOCUMENTS (June 8, 2013, 10:03 AM), 
ht~://www.ourdocuments.gov/document_data/pdf/doc_007.pdf. 
31 Lane Cnty., 74 U.S. at 76 ("But in many articles of the Constitution the necessary existence of the 
States, and, within their proper spheres, the independent authority of the States, is distinctly 
recognized."); see also Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 725 (1868); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 714-15 
p999); Bond v. United States, 131 S.Ct. 2355, 2364 (2011). 
16 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 752 (1833). 
317 Id. 
318 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501U.S.452, 458 (1991). 
319 See generally James L. Buchwalter, Annotation, Construction and Application of 10th Amendment 
by United States Supreme Court, 66 A.L.R. FED. 2d 159 (2012) (discussing all judicial opinions in 
which the Supreme Court has constructed or applied the 10th Amendment to the Constitution). 
320 Edward L. Rubin, Puppy Federalism and the Blessings of America, 574 ANN. AM. AcAD. POL. & 
Soc. Sci. 37, 48-49 (Alan W. Heston, Ed., 2001) ("Is this really federalism, is it really the way one 
sovereign treats another sovereign? It seems to bear a closer resemblance to the way a superior treats a 
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model was discussed as far back as the Constitutional Convention, the line 
was not distinct enough, and the Supreme Court has continuously struggled 
with how to remedy the problem. 321 
B. The Anti-Commandeering Doctrine 
While Congress has attempted to pass many federal laws that extend far 
beyond its limited legislative power, perhaps the most relevant to the Tenth 
Amendment are those pieces of legislation that attempt to "commandeer" 
the states. Congress "commandeers" when it passes legislation that either 
imposes specific legislation upon state legislatures or assigns a duty of 
enforcement to carry out federal law to state executive branches. 322 One of 
the most authoritative applications of the Tenth Amendment using the anti-
commandeering doctrine was the Supreme Court's decision in New York v. 
United States.323 The State of New York challenged the constitutionality of 
the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 ("the 
Act"). The Act attempted to resolve the failure of states to implement 
policies that would ensure the safe disposal of commercial radioactive 
waste through incentive schemes. 324 One of the provisions of the Act was a 
"take-title" provision that compelled any state that failed to adopt an 
appropriate plan to take possession of any radioactive waste produced 
within its borders. 325 The majority opinion, written by Justice O'Connor, 
declared the take-title provision to be an unconstitutional exercise of federal 
legislative power.326 Congress, she wrote, is not permitted to commandeer 
the internal legislative or executive processes of the individual states by 
"directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory 
program. "327 The Court cited two other prior cases to depict two occasions 
subordinate admiuistration. and not a very trusted subordinate at that."). 
321 Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 549-50 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (demanding boundaries 
that would clearly delineate state and federal power). 
322 Matthew D. Adler, State Sovereignty and the Anti-Commandeering Cases, 574 ANN. AM. AcAD. OF 
PoL.& Soc. Sci. 158, 163 (Alan W. Heston, Ed., 2001). 
323 See generally New York v. United States, 505 US 144 (1992) (Congress passed legislation whereby 
States either had to take title and possession of waster or States had to adhere to a specific waste policy. 
New York argued that this was the United States govermnent commandeering New York's right to 
develop a unique waste policy). 
324 Id. at 149-52; See also Thomas B. McAffee, Jay S. Bybee & A. Christopher Bryant, POWERS 
RESERVED FOR THE PEOPLE AND THE STATES: A HISTORY OF THE NINTH AND TENTH AMENDMENTS 
188-89 (2006). 
325 New York, 505 U.S. at 153-54. 
326 Id. at 186. 
327 Id. at 161 (citing Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 288 
(1981)). 
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when it upheld statutes against similar constitutional challenges. 328 In those 
two cases, however, it was determined that nowhere in either statute did 
Congress compel the states to enact federal law.329 Thus clearly 
distinguishing the facts of those two cases from the facts of New York.330 
The Court also notably stated that the extent of a potentially strong 
federal interest in forcing states to comply is irrelevant. 331 While the 
Government asserted that all provisions, the take-title provision included, 
were intended to encourage the States to establish safer policies for waste 
disposal, the Court noted that the provision went beyond encouragement 
and instead was a striking example of coercion. 332 In imposing such 
requirements on state governments, the Court felt that the Act relieved 
federal officials of accountability should the citizens of the state localities 
disapprove. 333 State officials are specifically elected to act in the best 
interest of their constituents, and they are unable to do so when the 
government has coerced them into adopting legislation in alignment with its 
federal regulatory scheme. 334 This theory of political accountability 
similarly underlies the holding in another Tenth Amendment milestone, 
Printz v. U.S.335 
C. Printz v. US 
In 1968, Congress enacted the Gun Control Act of 1968 ("the GCA"), 
which created a federal program to regulate the distribution of firearms. 336 
In 1993, Congress amended the GCA by enacting the Brady Handgun 
Violence Prevention Act, which required the Attorney General to create a 
national background check database.337 One of the provisions of the Brady 
Act required chief law enforcement officers ("CLEOs") throughout the 
country to conduct background checks and complete other relevant tasks 
328 See Hodel, 452 U.S. at 304-05; Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 769 (1982). 
329 Hodel, 452 U.S. at 304--05; Fed. Energy Reg. Comm 'n., 456 U.S. at 769. 
330 Hodel, 452 U.S. at 304--05; Fed. Energy Reg. Comm 'n., 456 U.S. at 769. 
331 New York, 505 U.S. at 178 ("No matter how powerful the federal interest involved, the Constitution 
simply does not give Congress the authority to require the States to regulate. The Constitution instead 
gives Congress the authority to regulate matters directly and to pre-empt contrary state regulation ... It 
~F not conscript state governments as its agents."). 
Id. at 174-75. 
333 Id. at 168-69. 
334 Id. 
335 Jennifer A Wiegleb, Strong Arming the States to Conduct Background Checks for Handgun 
Purchasers: An Analysis of State Autonomy, Political Accountability, and the Brady Handgun Violence 
Prevention Act, 48 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 373, 386 (1995). 
336 Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 
921 et seq. (1993)). 
337 Brady Handgun Control, Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 (1993) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-
925A (Supp. V. 1994)). 
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before the creation of a national database.338 Several CLEOs in Montana, 
Mississippi, Arizona and Vermont filed claims in federal court, alleging 
that the interim provisions of the GCA were unconstitutional, and each 
District Court ruled that it was unconstitutional.339 On appeal, however, the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. 340 The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari and heard the case on December 1996. 341 Justice Scalia wrote for 
the majority, reversing the Ninth Circuit decision and holding that Congress 
imposed an unconstitutional obligation on state officers to execute federal 
laws.342 A true originalist, Scalia relied heavily on constitutional history, 
citing the Federalist Papers as support of the Framers' intent.343 Moreover, 
the holding in New York and the anti-commandeering doctrine dictated 
much of the opinion. New York held that the anti-commandeering doctrine 
protected the state legislatures from federal encroachment, and Printz 
extended that holding by affording the same protection to the states' 
executive branches.344 The Court held that the requirement of CLEOs to 
take reasonable steps to investigate the legality of pending gun sales 
violated state sovereignty. 345 
In addition to offending notions of state autonomy, the background 
check mandate undermined political accountability in three ways. 346 First, 
CLEOs, as well as the state elected bodies that fund CLEOs, would be 
forced to reallocate funds to the background check system, instead of 
allocating funds to other programs that their constituents might support or 
desire. To avoid doing this, elected officials might be forced to raise taxes 
to cover the costs. Second, voters would likely be dissatisfied by the 
diversion of resources, and the CLEOs would face the repercussions of 
voter dissatisfaction. Third, there would be a blurry distinction as to who 
should be held politically "answerable," Congress or the CLEOs who were 
forced to comply with the GCA.347 To require states to enforce federal law 
or to regulate state law in compliance with federal law would thus 
338 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(2) (Supp. V 1993). 
339 Wiegleb, supra note 42, at 385-86 (citing the decisions of Printz v. United States, 854 F.Supp. 1503 
(D. Mont. 1994), McGee v. United States, 863 F.Supp. 321 (S.D. Miss. 1994), Mack v. United States, 
856 F.Supp. 1372 (D. Ariz. 1994), and Frank v. United States, 860 F.Supp. 1030 (D. Vt. 1994)). 
340 Mack v. United States, 66 F.3d 1025, 1034 (9th Cir. 1995). 
341 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
342 Id. at 935. 
343 Id. at 919-920. 
344 Adler, supra note 29, at 163; See also Wiegleb, supra note 42, at 391-93. 
345 Printz, 521 U.S. at 932. 
346 Wiegleb, supra note 42, at 387. 
347 Wiegleb, supra note 42, at 387. 
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essentially require that state officials act as agents of the Federal 
Government, directly contrary to the Framers' intent. 348 
D. Virginia's House Bill 2340 
In 1787, Alexander Hamilton wrote about the potential for the national 
government to invade state governance. 349 In such a situation, they can 
"discover the danger at a distance ... " and " ... at once adopt a regular plan of 
opposition, in which they can combine all the resources of the 
community."350 He even recognized the ability of states to communicate and 
unite against federal encroachment: "They can readily communicate with 
each other in the different States and unite like common forces for the 
protection of their common liberty."351 When President Obama first 
announced that he would be issuing several executive orders after the 
Newtown shooting, many states across the country rushed to pass 
preventative bills in their respective legislative sessions. 352 Most of the bills 
contained similar, if not identical, language: the state legislatures sought to 
prohibit state officers from enforcing federal law or assisting the 
government in any action that would violate their constitutional liberties. 353 
On January 18, 2013, only five days prior to the issuance of the 
President's executive orders, Virginia Delegate Bob Marshall (R-13th 
District), along with thirteen co-patrons, introduced House Bill 2340 to the 
Virginia General Assembly. The bill forbids any agency of the 
Commonwealth354 from knowingly aiding any entity of the Federal 
Government "in any investigation, prosecution, detention or arrest, or 
348 THE FEDERALIST No. 45. at 261 (James Madison) (ABA. 2009) ("Thus. each of the principal 
branches of the Federal Government will owe its existence more or less to the favor of state 
governments, and must consequently feel a dependence, which is much more likely to beget a 
disposition too obsequious than too overbearing towards them. On the other side, the component parts of 
the State governments will in no instance be indebted for their appointment to the direct agency of the 
Federal Government, and very little, if at all, to the local influence of its members."). 
349 THE FEDERALIST No. 28 (Alexander Hamilton). 
350 Id. 
351 Id. 
352 H.B. 2340, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2013); S.B. 129, 2013 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2013); H.B. 
357, Gen. Assemb., 2013-2014 Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2013); H.B. 42, 108th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 
2013); H.B. 553, 83rd Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2013); H.B. 0104, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Wyo. 2013). 
353 See, e.g., H.B. 553, 83rd Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2013) (prohibiting an act of a state employee that 
"intentionally enforces or attempts to enforce any acts, laws, executive orders, agency orders, rules or 
regulations of any kind whatsoever of the United States government relating to confiscating any firearm, 
banning any firearm, limiting the size of a magazine for any firearm, imposing any limit on the 
ammunition that may be purchased for any firearm, taxing any firearm or ammunition therefore, or 
re~uiring the registration of any firearm or ammunition therefore."). 
35 VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-385 (West 2011) (defining agency as "any department, division, 
commission, association, board, or other administrative body established pursuant to the laws of a 
jurisdiction"). 
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participation in any search or seizure, relating to any, criminal, civil, or 
administrative restrictions on firearms, firearm magazines, ammunition, or 
components thereof, based on any federal statute enacted, or Executive 
Order or regulation issued, after December 31, 2012 (emphasis added)."355 
Moreover, Section B of the bill outlaws the assistance by state officers to 
the Federal Government in conducting any "background check related to 
any ... transfer of firearms between citizens of the Commonwealth who do 
not possess any federal firearms license under 18 U.S.C. section 293."356 
The bill was ultimately referred to the Committee on Appropriations to 
determine the fiscal impact of its enactment, and was left in committee. 357 
E. Is it Constitutional? 
1. The Supreme Court says yes 
It is evident that these bills are precautionary measures introduced to 
protect the Second Amendment rights of the people and the Tenth 
Amendment rights of the states. This situation is distinguishable from that 
in Printz and New York because the bills were introduced before Congress 
had passed any legislation or the President issued any Executive Orders. 
The question is not whether the government can compel states to act; that 
was clearly answered by the Supreme Court. 358 Rather, it is whether states 
are permitted to enforce precautionary provisions that are seemingly 
contrary to the Supremacy Clause. The simple answer is yes. In Printz, the 
Court actually acknowledged that the state of Montana had enacted a law 
mandating non-compliance with the federal one, and that the plaintiff 
sheriffs, if they had complied with the government, would have been in 
violation of state law and incurred penalties. 359 
2. State officers take an oath to uphold the Constitution 
Moreover, an argument can be made for obligation of state officials to 
uphold their oath of office. Specifically, Article VI of the Constitution 
binds "Senators and Representatives, and the members of the several State 
legislatures, and all executive and judicial officers, both of the United 
States and the several States" by oath or affirmation to uphold the 
355 H.B. 2340, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2013). 
356 Id. 
357 Id. 
358 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
359 Printz, 521 U.S. at 934, n.18 (1997). 
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Constitution.360 James Madison explained the need for such a provision by 
stating that state officers are those who will play a critical role in giving 
effect to the Constitution.361 In Ableman v. Booth, the Supreme Court 
acknowledged that the States surrendered power to the Federal Government 
for their own protection from each other. 362 That being said, the states 
anticipated the full preservation of state powers as defined in the 
Constitution in Article VI. 363 Although the states conferred power to the 
government, one of the primary purposes of the Constitution was to protect 
against overreaching encroachment by the Federal Government. In 
swearing to uphold the Constitution, state officers not only promise to 
respect federal power, but also agree to protect the Constitutional liberties 
granted to United States citizens. 
Virginia has codified a similar oath for state officers. 364 For example, the 
Virginia Police Force has a written oath of office. 365 Furthermore, Virginia 
state representatives swear, upon oath or affirmation that they will uphold 
the Constitution. Representatives make this oath at least two times and a 
Virginia state police officer agrees to be an agent of the Constitution three 
times. Thus, these state officers do not swear to uphold the acts of 
Congress. In passing a bill such as House Bill 2340, Virginia officers are 
striving to uphold the Constitution by enforcing the boundary between state 
and federal power conferred in the Tenth Amendment, in an effort to 
protect the Second Amendment rights guaranteed to all citiziens. 
III. LEGAL EFFECTS 
Although the States do have the power to refuse to comply with a federal 
regulatory scheme, Congress has a concurrent power to refuse to provide or 
condition federal funding to the States. 366 Each year, the Federal 
360 U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
361 THE FEDERALIST, No. 44 (James Madison). 
362 Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. 506, 524 (1858). 
363 Id. at 524-25. 
364 VA Code Ann § 49-1 (West 2012) ("Every person before entering upon the discharge of any 
function as an officer of this Commonwealth shall take and subscribe the following oath: 'I do solemnly 
swear (or affirm) that I will support the Constitution of the United States, and the Constitution of the 
Commonwealth of Virginia, and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge all the duties incumbent 
upon me as .... accordingto the best of my ability, (so help me God)."'). 
365 Law Enforcement Oath of Honor, VIRGINIA ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, 
http://www.vachiefs.org/index.php/programs/oath_of_honor/ (last visited March 29, 2013) ("On my 
honor. . .I will always uphold the Constitution, the community, and the agency I serve, so help me 
God."). 
366 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 ("The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties 
Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the 
United States."). 
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Government provides billions of dollars that compose a large portion of 
each state's revenue,367 none of which are offered unconditionally.368 Some 
have noted that Congress's spending power is the greatest threat to state 
autonomy,369 as it essentially allows Congress to circumvent constitutional 
restrictions on federal regulation of the states. 370 As a result, many of the 
states attempting to pass these precautionary statutes will have to tediously 
examine the legal and fiscal effects before doing so. 
A. The Limitless Power of the Spending Clause 
The Court has explicitly held conditional federal funding to be a 
constitutional exercise of Congress' spending power. 371 In Oklahoma v. 
United States Civil Service Commission, the Supreme Court explicitly 
recognized that, while the government is powerless to regulate local 
politics, including elections and appointments of state officials, it does have 
the power to decide how federal funds will be disbursed to the states and 
the terms accompanying such disbursements. 372 In that case, Congress 
passed the Hatch Act, requiring Oklahoma to suspend a member of the 
Oklahoma Highway Commission so that Oklahoma could receive federal 
funds. 373 Oklahoma claimed that this condition violated its Tenth 
Amendment rights, but the Court did not deem the condition to constitute 
federal coercion and declared it valid. 374 
In situations such as these, where the Court does not find federal 
coercion, federal statutes are usually upheld because they are not seen as 
obligations to be followed by the States, bur instead are options which the 
States are free to accept or reject. 375 While the Court has adopted this 
coercion standard, it is often difficult to distinguish between a permissible 
condition and a coercive condition.376 For that reason, although it is 
367 Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1911, 1918 (1995). 
368 Id. 
369 Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending and States' Rights, 574 ANN. OF AM. AcA. OF POL. 
AND Soc. SCI. 104, 105 (2001). 
370 Id. at 104; see South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987). 
371 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992) ("The Constitution permits the Federal 
Government to hold out incentives to States as a means of encouraging them to adopt suggested 
rerlatory schemes."). 
37 Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127, 143 (1947). 
373 Id. at 133. 
374 Id. at 142-43. 
375 See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 US 447, 480 (1923). 
376 Neil S. Siegel, Commandeering and Its Alternatives: A Federalism Perspective, 59 V AND. L. REV. 
1629, 1656 (2006). 
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constitutional under the Spending Clause, conditional funding can be just as 
coercive as commandeering.377 
According to some, this distinction between conditional funding and 
commandeering is illusory: conditional federal spending in many cases 
forces states to consent to be commandeered, but such commandeering is 
really just as coercive in cases where the impact of losing federal funding is 
too great to do otherwise. 378 The issue for the Supreme Court is thus to 
determine how to find a way to distinguish among coercive conditions 
which contravene the States' Tenth Amendment rights, while upholding 
conditions which are within Congress' power to spend for the "general 
welfare" and do not constitute indirect regulation of the States.379 
The Supreme Court has suggested, implicitly, that the ability to condition 
federal funds is a loophole in our system of government, which allows 
Congress to "run around any restrictions the Constitution might be held to 
impose on [its] ability to regulate the States."380 This ultimately means 
Congress may exercise powers of regulation not enumerated to it by the 
Constitution, so long as it is an exercise of its Spending Power. South 
Dakota v. Dole established four limitations on conditional funding through 
the Spending Clause: (1) It must be in the pursuit of the general welfare; (2) 
The conditions must be unambiguous, so that States are well aware of the 
consequences of their participation or lack thereof; (3) the conditions must 
be related to the federal interest in particular national projects or programs; 
and (4) the conditions must not be barred by any other provisions of the 
Constitution.381 With regard to the Tenth Amendment argument, the Dole 
Court said that traditional limits on federal regulation of state affairs do not 
"concomitantly limit the range of conditions legitimately placed on federal 
grants. "382 
While the Dole court outlined a four-part test to determine if federal 
spending was constitutionally within its power, a more recent Supreme 
Court decision altered the thinking about Congress' spending power. 383 
National Federation oflndependent Business v. Sebelius ("NFIB ") was the 
first time that the Supreme Court considered the issue of federal coercion as 
a serious possibility in examining a federal statute, rather than just an 
377 Id. 
378 Id. at 1657. 
379 Baker, supra note 74, at 1920. 
380 Baker, supra note 76, at 105 (citing South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207-08 (1987)). 
381 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207-08 (1987). 
382 Id. at 210. 
383 Eloise Pasachoff, Conditional Spending After NFIB v. Sebelius: The Example of Federal Education 
Law, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 577, 577 (2013). 
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abstract possibility. 384 The Court found that the provlSlon of the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (the "PPACA"), which expanded 
Medicaid, was coercive and exceeded Congress's power under the 
Spending Clause. 385 A portion of the PP A CA gave the Secretary of Health 
and Human Services the authority to penalize States who chose not to 
participate in the expanded Medicaid program. 386 The PP ACA prescribed 
that the penalty would include the withholding of further Medicaid 
payments so long as the State continued to fail to comply.387 The Court 
concluded that this was an overreach by Congress because the PP ACA 
failed to give states an actual choice.388 Part of the plurality's justification 
for this conclusion was that individual liberties would suffer if all power 
were vested in one national government. 389 The Court also addressed the 
political accountability factor and stated that the voters would not know 
whom to blame for a particular program if States were forced to comply 
with federal objectives due to the withholding of federal funding. 390 If the 
States had a legitimate choice, there would be a clear distinction. 
Critics have proposed that the act of conditional federal funding divides 
the states into two groups: (1) the States that comply, with or without 
financial inducement (those that are unaffected by the choice of funding) 
and (2) the States that find the conditions to be unattractive and face the 
choice of having the funds withheld in order to comply with the 
condition(s) or complying with the undesirable regulation to receive the 
funds. 391 Because there are typically no other alternative sources of revenue, 
the States in the second group are extremely restricted in their legislative 
and executive decision-making. Most, if not all States fall into this second 
group, including Virginia. 
B. Appropriations Committee 
Virginia House Bill 2340 was received with an Impact Statement that 
described the possible fiscal impact of its enactment. 392 The conclusion was 
384 Id. 
385 Nat'! Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 2662 (2012). 
386 Id. 
387 Id. at 2607. 
388 Id. at 2608. 
389 Id. at 2602. 
390 Id. at 2660. 
391 Baker, supra note 75, at 106-07. 
392 VA. DEP'T OF PLANNING AND BUDGET, H.B. 2340 FISCAL IMPACT STATEMENT (2013), available at 
http:! /leg! .state. va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?ses= 13 l&typ=bil&val=hb2340 (follow "Impact Statement" 
hyperlink). 
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that the proposal would not have a direct fiscal impact within the state, but 
the repercussions of its implementation were unknown. 393 The State Police 
warned that the possibility of the revocation of federal funding for firearm 
related initiatives would result in an entire project going unfunded. 394 The 
project at issue would give the Supreme Court of Virginia capability to 
"scan mental commitment orders and make them available electronically to 
Virginia State Police," and the State risked losing $793,568.00, the current 
amount of federal funding supporting the project. 395 The House of Delegates 
opted to refer the bill to the House Committee on Appropriations to 
determine the exact impact. Once there, the bill was left in the committee 
and did not pass. 
According to Delegate Bob Marshall, the sponsor of the bill, those who 
voted to send the bill to the Appropriations Committee did so because they 
believed the State would lose funding as a result. 396 Marshall cited House 
Bill 1160, a 2012 bill that became law last July, which is similar to House 
Bill 2340 in that it addresses federal intrusion into the rights of the citizens 
of Virginia.397 He wrote that, to his knowledge, no funding has been 
withheld from the government after the passage of House Bill 1160, so 
none would be withheld with the passage of House Bill 2340. 398 
Nevertheless, the bill was left in committee. According to Marshall, 
"silence on House Bill 2340 is consent to an agreement with federal efforts 
to abridge our Second Amendment rights. "399 While this statement is 
arguable, House Bill 2340 still serves as a prime example of a State acting 
in fear of its national government. Thus, the potential of the Federal 
Government withholding funds has caused Virginia to fail to pass a piece of 
legislation that would preserve both its Tenth Amendment rights and the 
Second Amendment rights of its citizens. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Federal Government has made a strong push for anti-gun legislation 
in the months following the agonizing, unbelievable massacre of small 
393 Id. 
394 Id. 
395 Id. 
396 Bob Marshall, Your Second Amendment Rights are on the Line!, BOB MARSHALL: REPUBLICAN 
DELEGATE, http://delegatebob.com/email-alerts-archive/your-2nd-amendment-rights-are-on-the-line 
(last visited Mar. 29, 2013). 
397 H.B. 1160, 2012 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2012), available at http://lis.virginia.gov/cgi-
bin/legp604.exe?ses=l2l&typ=bil&val=hbll60 (follow 04/18/12 Governor: Acts of Assembly Chapter 
text (CHAP0792) pdf link for full text); Id .. 
398 Marshall, supra note 103. 
399 Id. 
70 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST [Vol. XVIl:i 
children in Newtown, Connecticut, this past December. While it is evident 
that efforts need to be made to reduce gun violence, law-abiding citizens 
fear that their Second Amendment rights are being taken away. As 
representatives of those citizens, state legislators have taken proactive steps 
to prevent the intrusion of both Congress and the Executive Branch on 
constitutional rights of both citizens and the states themselves. According to 
a close reading of the Tenth Amendment, as well as Supreme Court 
precedent, Congress may not impose a federal regulatory scheme on the 
States that compels their compliance. Consequently, the States may pass 
legislation to preserve their autonomy through the Tenth Amendment. State 
officials are bound by oath to uphold the Constitution, and this includes the 
promise to protect the individual liberties of their citizens. While the States 
can choose to permissibly assert their rights as sovereigns in this way, the 
choice will not come without cost. Congress may condition federal 
funding, and States are at risk of losing grant funds should they pass 
legislation contrary to the objectives of federal regulations. That being said, 
with the recent holding in NFIB,40° Congress's spending power is no longer 
limitless. If conditional funding related to future anti-gun legislation is at all 
coercive, Congress will not be able to circumvent the specific enumerated 
powers declared in the Constitution. 
400 Nat"! Fed"n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius. 132 S.Ct. 2566, 2662 (2012). 
